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Abstract 
 
The determinants of credit risk of banks in emerging economies have received limited attention in 
the literature. Using advanced panel data techniques, the paper seeks to examine the factors 
affecting problem loans of Indian state-owned banks for the period 1994-2005, taking into 
account both macroeconomic factors as well as microeconomic variables. The findings reveal that 
at the macro level, GDP growth and at the bank level, real loan growth, operating expenses and 
bank size play an important role in influencing problem loans. The study performs certain 
robustness tests of the results and discusses several policy implications of the analysis.  
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Determinants of Credit Risk in Indian State-owned Banks:  
An Empirical Investigation 
 
Introduction  
 
The health of the financial sector is a matter of policy concern, especially in developing 
countries where failure in financial intermediation can disrupt the development process. 
Empirical research has uncovered robust evidence supporting the view that financial development 
contributes to economic growth. At the cross-country level, for instance, measures of financial 
development such as financial intermediary sector’s assets and domestic credit to private sector 
have been found to be positively correlated with economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998; Aghion et al., 2005). Similarly, at the firm level, researchers have 
found that firms in countries with more financial development are able to obtain more external 
funds and thereby grow faster (Demirgúc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).   
Notwithstanding these advancements, there is limited work of operational relevance for 
improving the functioning of the financial sector. It is argued that the major economic upheavals 
have their origins in a banking crisis. Illustratively, the events during the second half of the 1990s 
in Asia and elsewhere provided graphic testimony that the combination of a weak financial 
system and inadequate macroeconomic policies - with weakness in one area reinforcing problems 
in the other – were instrumental in exacerbating the crises. What is also widely documented is the 
fact that the problems faced by Asia’s banking systems were the legacy of years of bad lending 
practices fuelled by inadequate supervision and regulation that led to rapid lending growth and 
excessive risk taking (Lindgren et al., 1997; Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003).  
The aforesaid examples clearly illustrate the role of credit risk affecting the functioning 
of the overall economy. There is limited work in the empirical literature examining the 
determinants of credit risk for improving the functioning of the financial sector. This is our point 
of entry into the paper. More specifically, the analysis examines the proximate causes of credit 
risk in state-owned banks (SOBs) in India during 1994-2005. This represents the highest 
periodicity with which data on the concerned variables is available on a consistent basis. In 
particular, the study examines ex-post loan losses at the bank-level and investigates the 
determinants of such losses, taking into account both macroeconomic factors and microeconomic 
variables that approximate the credit policies of financial intermediaries. The exercise is confined 
to the state-owned banks, so as to examine the determinants of problem loans within a class that 
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is homogeneous on the ownership dimension and comprises the majority of the banking sector 
assets over the sample period. Therefore, the paper contributes to the credit risk literature by 
providing empirical evidence that enables to assess expected credit losses combining macro- and 
microeconomic data. Towards this end, the study performs advanced panel data techniques, 
thereby ensuring avoidance of estimation bias and specification problems. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the received 
literature. The following section describes the institutional structure of the Indian banking sector 
and provides evidence of the evolution of problem loans during the period under study. Section 4 
provides an overview of the factors affecting problem loans of banks. The empirical model and 
the sample data are presented in Section 5. The model estimation and a discussion of the results 
are contained in Section 6. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
Several theoretical explanations have appeared in the literature to explain fluctuations in 
credit policies of banks. The most common reflection of this phenomenon arises from the fact that 
management compensation structures can generate perverse incentives, which in turn, is an aspect 
of the principal-agent problem. Once managers obtain a reasonable return on equity for their 
shareholders, they may engage in activities that depart from the firm’s value maximization. To 
the extent that managers have limited liability, a manifestation of this possibility could be to 
favour high risk-return strategies (i.e., over extension of credit) in order to increase the social 
presence of the bank managers or the power of managers in an enlarging organization 
(Williamson, 1963).  
Second, strong competition among banks or between banks and other financial 
intermediaries erodes margins and puts pressure on banks’ bottomlines. To compensate for 
declining profitability, bank managers might sacrifice objectivity in credit evaluation standards 
and increase loan growth indiscriminately at the expense of the (future) quality of their loan 
portfolios. To the extent that such loans turn out to be non-performing only with a lag, it might 
encourage further loan growth. 
Herd behavior (Rajan 1994) might also help to explain why bank managers finance 
negative NPV projects during expansions. The fact that others are lending may be considered as 
invaluable information concerning the creditworthiness of a potential borrower. And importantly, 
managerial performance is generally judged relative to some market benchmark. The 
disincentives for being wrong in company are generally much less than for being wrong in 
isolation. Managers, as a result, have a strong incentive to behave as their peers, which, at an 
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aggregate level, enhances lending booms and recessions. Short-term objectives are prevalent and 
might explain why banks finance projects during expansions that, later on, will become non-
performing loans.  
Fourth, the extended passage of time since the last loan bust could lead to an 
accumulation of problem loans in the books of banks. This could be the result of two 
complementary forces. First, the proportion of loan officers that experienced the last bust declines 
as the bank hires new, younger employees and the former ones retire, leading to an overall loss of 
learning experience. Second, some of the experienced officers might not be able to adequately 
recollect the previous bust; the more far away is the earlier recession, the less likely is their 
recollection of the previous bust. The culmination of these forces is an overall decline in the 
institutional memory, a cadre less skilful of adequately judging credit risk, resulting in a build up 
of problem loans (Berger and Udell, 2004).  
Finally, collateral might also play a role in influencing bad loans. In an upturn, rapid 
increases in asset prices increase the availability of pledgable funds, propelling banks to increase 
lending, since it has an (increasingly worthier) asset to back the loan. The net effect of these 
developments could be an overall decline in credit standards, including the need to pledge 
collateral. As the upturn recedes and recessionary tendencies gather momentum, the decline in 
asset values leads to an overall lowering in collateral values as well, leading to an overall decline 
in credit standards, aggravating bad loans and fueling credit cycles (Gabriel et al., 2006). 
Notwithstanding these theoretical advancements, available evidence of the factors 
influencing credit risk is admittedly limited. The extant research has concentrated mostly on 
evaluation of ex-ante risks of borrowers and/or of individual loan operations, and on studying the 
response of lenders to such evaluations (Santomero, 1997; Altman and Saunders, 1998; 
Holmstrom and Tirole, 2000). Credit spreads, collateral, loan term structures and commitments 
between borrowers and lenders over time (relational lending) have been some of the widely 
investigated topics. Other relevant variables, such as ex-post credit losses, have been largely 
ignored, especially at the micro-level of financial institutions, possibly owing to the lack of 
reliable data on loan losses.  
The majority of the studies in this area have primarily dealt with the US banking industry 
(Berger and Young, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbis, 1997) and to a lesser extent, the Mexican 
(Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al., 1997) banking sector. Using data on US banks for 1985-94, Berger 
and DeYoung (1997) found that decreases in cost efficiency are related to increases in non-
performing loans, suggesting that high levels of problem loans cause banks to increase spending 
on monitoring. For the period 1986:2 to 1995:4, Kwan and Eisenbis (1997) demonstrate that 
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inefficient banks are more prone to risk-taking. In case of the Mexican banking sector, Gonzalez-
Hermosillo et al. (1997) found that the higher the proportion of non-performing loans to total 
loans, the greater is the probability of banking failure. Salas and Saurina (2002) find that, for the 
Spanish banking sector, credit risk was significantly influenced by individual bank-level 
variables, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions.   
In the Indian context, Rajaraman et al. (1999) examined the regional dimension of the 
non-performing loan problem. The study was, however, confined to only a single year, viz., 1996-
97, and employed only macro variables to explain problem loans, which, in a way, limited the 
empirical appeal of the model. However, it is widely believed that problem loans are the result by 
both macroeconomic as well as microeconomic factors. Illustratively, in a downturn, the 
condition of the borrower generally deteriorates, resulting in a setback in the repayment schedule, 
thereby possibly engendering greater problem loans. At the same time, bank-specific factors, such 
as low operating efficiency and unbridled branch expansion, might also lead to accumulation of 
problem loans. This would mean that not only macroeconomic conditions, but also 
microeconomic variables are important in explaining problem loans in banks.  
We choose India as a case study for two reasons. First, India is presently one of the most 
important developing countries in the present world with a rich history of banking sector controls 
(Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). Since the initiation of economic reforms in the 1990s, these 
controls have gradually been deregulated, allowing greater role of market forces in the resource 
allocation process. Second, the time period of the study spans a decade coinciding with the 
inception of financial sector reforms and enables to clearly isolate the factors influencing banks’ 
problem loans. The findings so obtained may be representative of the factors affecting problem 
loans in banks in other emerging markets. 
  
3. Indian Banking System and Evolution of Problem Loans 
The Indian banking system is characterized by a large number of banks with mixed 
ownership2. The commercial banking segment comprises 27 SOBs in which Government has 
majority ownership of over 51% percent, 40 private sector banks and 33 foreign banks. Total 
bank assets constituted a little over 80 percent of GDP in 2004-05. Public sector banks had a 75% 
share in the assets of the banking system in 2004-05, while private and foreign banks constituted 
                                                 
2 The banking system in India consists of commercial and co-operative banks, of which the former accounts 
for around 98 per cent of banking system assets. The entire segment is referred to as Scheduled 
Commercial Banks, since they are included in the Second Schedule of the RBI Act, 1934.  The financial 
year for commercial banks runs from the first day of April of a particular year to the last day of March in 
the subsequent year. 
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25 percent. In 1991, public sector banks share in the total assets of the banking system was a little 
over 90%. 
Prior to the initiation of financial sector reforms in 1992, the financial system essentially 
catered to the needs of planned development where the Government sector had a predominant 
role in every sphere of economic activity. The pre-emption of a large proportion of bank deposits 
in the form of reserves and an administered interest rate regime resulted in high cost and low 
quality financial intermediation. The existence of a complex structure of interest rates arising 
from economic and social concerns of providing concessional credit to certain sectors resulted in 
‘cross subsidization’ which implied that higher rates were charged from non-concessional 
borrowers. Even the free portion of banks’ resources was subject to ‘credit norms’, which set 
inflexible limits to loans according to sector, purpose and security. On the expenditure front, 
inflexibility in licensing of branches and management structures constrained the operational 
independence and functional autonomy of banks and raised overhead costs. The net effect of 
these developments was distortion of interest rates and the inefficient allocation of scarce 
resources.   
With so much emphasis on allocating assets according to Government guidelines, income 
recognition rules and asset classification norms were of secondary importance. The first effort for 
standardization of credit assets for a better understanding of the inherent risk component was 
made in 1985 when RBI introduced categorization of bank advances termed as ‘health code’ 
system. Accordingly, loans were classified into eight health codes depending on the repayment 
history of the borrower.3 While the health code system provided for the categorization of bank-
credit based on risk exposure, it did not provide for risk coverage on account of credit assets 
turning non-productive. The classification was left to the discretion of each bank, which meant 
that these norms were highly subjective, so that large amounts of income accrued on non-
performing loans, and reduced incentives for maintaining a high quality portfolio.  
The underlying philosophy of financial sector reforms initiated in 1992 was to make the 
banking system more responsive to changes in the market environment. Accordingly, statutory 
pre-emptions were lowered, interest rates deregulated and banks allowed to raise capital not 
                                                 
3 The eight health code categories were: satisfactory, irregular, sick (viable under nursing), sick (non-
viable/sticky), advances recalled, suit-filed accounts, decreed debt and debts classified by the bank as 
bad/doubtful. Of these, four categories, viz., advances recalled, suit-filed accounts, decreed debt and debts 
classified by the bank as bad/doubtful were deemed as non-performing. 
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exceeding 49% of their equity. Objective criteria were instituted for loan classification and 
provisioning, in line with international best practices.4  
  Evidence of competitive pressures on the Indian banking industry is well supported from 
the decline in the five bank asset concentration ratio from 0.46 in 1993-94 and thereafter to 0.38 
in 2004-05 and by the increasing number of private and foreign banks. The performance of SOBs 
has become attuned to profitability considerations, with return on asset at 1% from negative 
levels in 1993-94. Reflecting the growing efficiency of the intermediation process, the net interest 
income to total assets from declined from over 3% to around 2.8% over this period (Table 1). 
Table 1: Summary of the Banking Industry: 1993-94 to 2004-05 
Year /Bank group              1993-94                          1998-99              2004-05 
SOBs Pvt. Forgn. SOBs Pvt. Forgn. SOBs Pvt. Forgn.
No. of Banks 27 24 23 27 35 44 28 29 31
Total asset (Rs. bn.)   22018 4279 1536
Deposits (Rs. bn.) 3034 201 259 6369 868 475 14207 3146 865
Credit (Rs. bn.) 1469 98 116 297 428 295 8093 2211 753
Credit/deposit (%) 48 49 45 47 49 62 57 70 87
Share of (in %):     
  Total Deposits 86 6 8 83 11 6 78 17.3 4.7
  Total Credit 87 6 7 80 12 8 73 20 7
Total Income (Rs. bn.) 373 24 41 789 115 97 1476 326 130
Total Expenses (Rs. bn.) 417 23 35 756 108 90 1318 291 110
Net Profit (Rs. bn.) -44 1 6 33 7 7 158 35.3 20
Net interest margin 2.36 2.97 4.21 2.81 2.09 3.47 2.91 2.34 3.52
SOBs. State-owned Banks; Pvt. Private Sector Banks; Forgn: Foreign Banks 
 
In spite of the substantial progress made in terms of improving the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the financial system, a concern of policymakers remains in terms of the high 
quantum of non-performing loans. Notwithstanding the gradual tightening of prudential norms 
over the reform period (Table 2), the non-performing loans of state-owned banks stood at over 
Rs.480 billion at end-March 2005, comprising over 5% of their total advances and around 80% of 
the non-performing loans of the commercial banking sector (Table 3).5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 As at end-March 2005, the cash reserve ratio was 5% (statutory minimum of 3 %) and the statutory 
liquidity ratio was 25 % (the statutory minimum). The corresponding figures as at end-March 1994 were 
14.0 % and 34.25 %, respectively. 
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Table 2: Evolution of IRAC norms – Cross Country Comparisons 
 Sub-standard  Doubtful Memo: NPL/Total loans (%) 
Non-performing loans in India 
(period overdue in months- M) 
   
1993-94 10 M 25 M 24.8 
1995-96 7 M 25 M 18.0  
1999-2000 7 M  25 M 14.0 
2002-03  6 M 18 M 9.4 
2003-04 3 M 18 M 7.8 
2004-05 3 M 12 M 5.5 
Memo: International practices    
China Overdue   15.6 (2004) 
Indonesia 3 M 6 M 13.4 (2004) 
Korea 3 M (July 1998) ‘expected to be loss’ 1.7 (2004) 
Malaysia 6 M 9 M 11.6 (2005) 
Thailand 3 M 6 M 11.9 (2004) 
Argentina 3 M 6 M 17.1 (2005) 
Brazil 2 M 6 M 3.9 (2004) 
Chile 1 M (mortgage) 
2  M (consumer) 
7 M (mortgage) 
4 M (consumer) 
1.2 (2005) 
Mexico 6 M (mortgage) 
3 M (other) 
 2.4 (2005) 
Czech Rep.  3 M 6 M 4.8 (2005) 
Poland 1 M or  
‘borrower in poor 
state’ 
 15.5 (2004) 
Figures for India refers to state-owned banks 
Figures in brackets for other countries refer to the latest year for which data are reported 
Source: RBI (2005b), Hawkins and Turner (1999) and IMF (2005) 
 
Table 3: Non-performing Loans of Different Bank Groups: 1994-2005 
Year  
(end-March) 
SOBs Old Private Banks New Private Banks Foreign 
Banks 
1994 410 (24.8) N.C. N.C. N.C. 
1995 384 (19.5) N.C. N.C. N.C. 
1996 416 (18.0) N.C. N.C. N.C. 
1997 436 (17.8) 23 (10.7) 2 (2.6) 12 (4.3) 
1998 456 (16.0) 28 (10.9) 4 (3.5) 20 (6.4) 
1999 517 (15.9) 38 (13.1) 9 (6.2) 24 (7.6) 
2000 530 (14.0) 38 (10.8) 10 (4.1) 26 (7.0) 
2001 547 (12.4) 43 (10.9) 16 (5.1) 31 (6.8) 
2002 564 (11.1) 48 (11.0) 68 (8.9) 27 (5.4) 
2003 540 (9.4) 46 (8.9) 62 (7.6) 28 (5.3) 
2004 515 (7.8) 44 (7.6) 59 (5.0) 29 (4.6) 
2005 485 (5.5) 42 (6.0) 46 (3.6) 22 (2.8) 
N.C. Not Compiled 
Amount in Rs. billion. 
Figures in brackets are as percent to total advances. 
 
 In the study, we measure problem loans in relative terms as the ratio between problem 
loans to total loans. The annual bank-wise figure is published by the RBI in its banking report 
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titled Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India. Chart 1 plots the development of the 
problem loans ratio of state-owned banks and the evolution of GDP (inverse growth rate) for the 
Indian economy over the period 1994-2005. The cyclical behavior of problem loans is confirmed 
by observing the overlap between the ratio of problem loans (on average for all state-owned 
banks) and the GDP growth variable. 
Chart 1: Non-performing Loans of State-owned 
Banks and GDP Growth
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 In order to contain their problem loans, banks have been provided with a menu of 
strategies. These steps have been preventive, remedial and legal in nature. For instance, corporate 
debt restructuring mechanism has been introduced aimed at restructuring the debt of viable 
corporate entities. Another major step has been the introduction of One Time Settlement (OTS) 
schemes. Compromise settlements have been operational at several time points over the sample 
period to provide an opportunity to borrowers for settlement of their outstanding dues. More 
recently, an Act has been passed which seeks to strengthen creditor rights. Given the concentrated 
focus devoted to tackling the problem of non-performing loans, the issue, therefore, arises 
whether it is possible to identify factors influencing problem loans.  
 
4. Determinants of Banks’ Problem Loans  
Disaster myopia, herding behaviour, perverse incentives and principal-agent problems are 
the main factors that explain mistakes in bank credit policy in an expansionary phase. Banks 
could be forced into an excessive credit expansion as a fall-out of an informational externality 
that makes bank credit policies interdependent. Short-term concerns, coupled with the fact that 
the market is more forgiving if judgemental errors are made by several participants at the same 
time, often lead bank managers to pursue an expansionary credit policy that raise borrowers’ debt 
levels, with an adverse effect on the loan portfolio. 
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4.1 Macroeconomic Conditions 
The empirical evidence tends to suggest that banks problem loans are closely related to 
economic activity: in other words, behind every financial crisis, there are macroeconomic factors, 
such as downturns in aggregate economic activity. When growth slows or even turns negative, 
firms and households reduce their cash inflows (sales, wages), which, in turn, render it difficult 
for them to repay the loans. Banks anticipate that if a recession occurs, firms and households will 
encounter liquidity shortages, which, in turn, would raise the likelihood of delays in the 
fulfillment of their financial obligations (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006). Under such circumstances, 
they are more inclined to pursue a stringent credit policy (credit crunch), exacerbating the 
liquidity difficulties of firms and households. Economic activity is further slowed down 
compounding the problem loan difficulty.  
In the present setup, aggregate economic activity is measured by real GDP growth rate 
(GDPGR), since GDP is highly informative of other relevant macro variables. We are also 
interested in the lag structure of the effects of economic activity on problem loans.  
 Proponents of financial liberalisation argue that a financially repressed regime constraints 
savings and investment through negative real rates of interest (see, for instance, Ghatak, 1981; 
Fry, 1988). In the banking sector, it seems likely that high real interest rates could raise the cost 
of capital for borrowers and make it difficult for them to repay their loans on time. This would 
suggest that higher real rates of interest would engender higher non-performing loans, and as a 
result, the coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive.   
 
 
4.2 Microeconomic Factors 
The literature identifies moral hazard, ownership structure and regulatory actions as the 
primary factors influencing bank risk-taking behaviour (Kwan and Eisenbis, 1997). The 
theoretical determinants of bank risk-taking are translated into a tractable empirical specification 
by measuring the effect of observable variables, such as credit growth, operating efficiency and 
solvency.  
A rapid credit expansion is considered one of the most important causes of problem loans 
(Caprio et al., 1994).5 During economic expansion, banks are often engaged in fierce competition 
for market share in loans, resulting in rapid credit growth. An easy way to garner market share 
                                                 
5 As one referee pointed out, a rapid expansion of credit, by itself, is not always a problem. It depends upon 
the stability of the money demand function and the growth of output. 
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could be to lend to borrowers of inferior credit quality. The market share strategy is even more 
dangerous if the bank is a new entrant in a product or regional market. Initially, banks selling new 
products will probably have more problem loans in their new business simply because they lack 
the necessary credit risk management expertise. Banks entering a distinct regional market will be 
subject to adverse selection. It is likely that incumbents will allow the riskiest customers to leave 
the bank, but attempt to retain the creditworthy ones. The risk profile of a client becomes known 
only with passage of time. The informational disadvantage of new entrants together with their 
appetite for market share is often a recipe for loan portfolio problems at a later stage. Alternately, 
managers that are poorly monitored by shareholders might be willing to increase risk in order to 
bolster short-term profitability. Therefore, managers could have incentives towards overextension 
of credit in order to maximise utility.  
Several additional factors could also affect the level of bank problem loans. First, 
inefficient banks performing poor screening and monitoring of borrowers will tend to have 
inferior portfolio quality. Kwan and Eisenbis (1997) demonstrate that higher levels of bank 
inefficiency can lead to an increase in problem loan ratios of banks. Net interest margins could 
also impinge on problem loans. A decrease in margins can prompt banks to adopt ‘gamble for 
resurrection’ strategies, resulting in the creation of a loan portfolio with higher probability of 
default in the future (Dewartipont and Tirole, 1994). Not only margins, but also if the bank has 
solvency problems, the incentives to shift to riskier portfolios becomes difficult to resist. It is also 
possible that if the increase in loans is made in a traditional geographical market, the impact of 
problem loans can be kept under control. However, if the bank enters into a new geographical 
market, e.g., opening branches in new areas, the adverse selection problem could be important. 
The higher ex-post credit risk may be anticipated by the bank by charging an ex-ante risk 
premium in the interest on the loan. Finally, since bigger banks have greater opportunities for 
portfolio diversification vis-à-vis smaller ones, microeconomic determinants of problem loans 
need to control for bank size. 
 
5. Econometric Model and Data (ABHIMAN, may like to redraft) 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, one can postulate the following equation for the ratio 
of problem loans of bank i in year t (NPLi,t): 
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                                                                                                                                         (1) 
Since the ratio of problem loans to total loans is a truncated variable (bounded between 
zero and one), in order to make it amenable for the analysis, we make a logarithmic 
transformation of NPLi,t, so that it can assume values in the range (-∝, +∝). The new dependent 
variable is ln [NPLi,t/(1-NPLi,t)].  
It has been observed that in the Indian banking system, the problems of non-performing 
loans has a sizeable legacy component arising from infirmities in the existing processes of debt 
recovery, inadequate legal provisions on foreclosure and bankruptcy and difficulties in the 
execution of court decrees (Jalan, 2001). This would suggest that the ratio of problem loans of 
one period is closely related to that of the previous period, since the problem loans are not 
immediately written down, but are, in fact, carried forward in the balance sheet. This would 
suggest a positive coefficient of γo. 
The impact of aggregate economic activity is measured by using the real GDP growth 
rate (ΔGDPt-h). We include the current rate as well as one lag to assess the timing. Intuitively, one 
would expect negative coefficients, since improved economic activity would imply better 
repayment by borrowers and therefore, a lowering of problem loans (Salas and Saurina, 2002). 
REG is a dummy variable that assumes a value of one from 2001 onwards, else zero. This is 
because the definition of problem loans was tightened in 2000-01. This would imply a positive 
sign of γ1.6 
As regards microeconomic determinants, ΔLNGRi,t-k is the real loan growth rate for each 
bank lagged one through four years. A target of rapid increase in market share can force the bank 
to compromise on the quality of borrowers, which, in turn, might provoke higher problem loans. 
We expect positive coefficients on these variables. If the bank advances loans in a traditional 
geographical market where bank managers are well-versed with their clients, problem loans can 
be kept under control. However, if the bank enters into a new geographical market (i.e., opening 
of branches in new areas), the adverse selection problem could be important. To control for the 
impact of branch network growth, we include ΔBRANCHi,t-q (lagged bank branch growth). We 
expect positive signs on the coefficients reflecting managers’ lack of familiarity of the new area.  
In order to capture bank-level inefficiency (INEFF), we use the ratio of operating 
expenses to total assets. Operating expenses capture wage expenditure as well as non-wage 
expenses (such as rent, taxes, directors’ fees, lighting, advertisement and publicity expenses, etc.). 
                                                 
6 Prior to 2000-01, a loan was treated as non-performing if interest and/or installment of principal remained 
overdue for more than 180 days plus a grace period of 30 days. This grace period (termed ‘past due’) was 
removed effective April 2001.  
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A high value of the variable indicates that the costs of intermediation are high, so that bank 
managers are unable to internalise the positive externalities of a bigger branch network and 
employees to increase profitability. We expect the coefficient to be of positive sign. Bigger banks 
might be better able to control problem loans by diversifying their loan portfolio vis-à-vis smaller 
ones. To control for this, we include the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), a monotonic 
transformation of assets, and expect negative coefficient on the variable. 
The incentives of managers are introduced using the variable SPRDi,t-s, the net interest 
margin lagged two and three years. A reduction in the margin can bring about a change in the 
credit policy of the bank, making it riskier, since there is less to lose if the outcome turns adverse. 
The increase in risk will create a loan portfolio with higher default probability in the future, 
which is the reason for the lags on the variable. The coefficients of the variable are expected to be 
negative. If the bank has solvency problems, then it might have an incentive to shift to riskier 
portfolios in order to shore up the capital base. To capture this possibility, we include CRARi,t-u, 
the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets lagged two and three years. The impact of solvency 
difficulties is not straightforward. Problem loans are likely to appear at a later date consequent 
upon a change in the credit policy of the bank. On the one hand, the higher the solvency ratio, the 
lower the incentives to take more risks. Alternately, higher solvency ratios could also provide 
incentives to banks to pursue higher profits by following high risk-return strategies. The sign of 
the coefficient on this variable is, therefore, not clear a priori. 
The higher ex-post credit risk may be anticipated by the bank charging higher ex-ante risk 
premium on the interest of the loan. To account for this possibility, we include PRMi,t-3 (the 
difference between the income stemming from loans over total loans less average end-period call 
money rate) as a proxy for the risk premium. The lag structure is designed to catch the ex-ante 
component of risk premium. If riskier loans are properly priced, we should find a positive 
coefficient for the parameter of the variable. However, it might be possible not to find a positive 
impact if strong competition introduces cross-subsidisation of products inside banks. 
Finally, to control for the composition of loan portfolio, we include the ratio of non-
priority sector loans to total loans (NPRIOLi,t). This variable reflects credit to the industrial sector 
(with or without collateral backing). Higher loans to non-priority sector might lead to lower 
problem loans if the bank has sound credit risk management practices or alternately, if might be 
the reverse. The sign on this variable is, therefore, not clear a priori, and is left to be determined 
econometrically. ηi captures unobservable effects due to intrinsic characteristics of each bank (the 
risk aversion of managers, their preferences for maximising profits or growth, etc). εi,t is random 
disturbance. 
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Bank-wise data on the concerned variables starting 1994 are published by the RBI in its 
two banking publications, viz., Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India (RTP), a yearly 
statutory report which provides bank-wise information on financial and prudential ratios and 
Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India (STB), a yearly publication which provides bank-
wise data on assets and liabilities and profit and loss figures. The data on the macro-variables are 
published in the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, a yearly report which provides time 
series information on macroeconomic variables.  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. Three features of the table are 
of interest. First, over the sample period, operating expenses has been high on average, with a low 
variability. Second, the average CRAR for state-owned banks was 9.90%, although with high 
variability. Finally, the premium (PRM), on average, is negative for the state-owned banks, 
reflecting the fact that, during many years, there was cross-subsidisation from liability to asset 
operations in the state-owned banking system. 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Notation  Empirical definition  Source  Mean  Std.Dev. 
NPL/(1‐NPL)  Non‐performing loans  Report on Trend and Progress of Banking  0.143  0.052 
GDPGR  Growth rate of real GDP  Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy  0.063  0.013 
ADVGR  Growth in real advances  Statistical tables relating to banks in India  0.146  0.497 
BKOFF  Growth in number of bank offices  Statistical tables relating to banks in India  0.035  0.175 
INEFF  Operating expenses/total asset  Report on Trend and Progress of Banking  0.026  0.006 
NPRIOL  Loans to non‐priority sector/total loans  Report on Trend and Progress of Banking  0.654  0.061 
SIZE  Log(bank asset)  Statistical tables relating to banks in India  9.851  0.995 
SPRD  Interest  income  less  interest 
expense/total asset 
Report on Trend and Progress of Banking  0.029  0.008 
CRAR  Capital (tier‐I plus tier‐II)/risk weighted 
assets 
Report on Trend and Progress of Banking  0.106  0.095 
PRM  Income  from  loans/total  loans  less  call 
money rate 
Report on Trend and Progress of Banking and 
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 
‐0.081  0.033 
 
6. Results and Discussion  
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (1) may yield unsatisfactory 
results, because dynamic models are likely to suffer from both endogeneity and heterogeneity 
problems. The presence of lagged endogenous variables will also bias the coefficient estimates 
for the OLS estimation. Moreover, substantial differences in non-performing loans across banks 
may result in heterogeneity problems.  
The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation is widely used for dynamic panel 
data models. If there are no unobserved firm effects, we can apply the GMM technique to (1) in 
levels by using lagged right hand side variables as instruments.  
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The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether the lagged values of the 
micro variables are valid instruments in the regression procedure. A necessary condition for the 
validity of such instruments is that the error term be serially uncorrelated. To address these issues, 
we present two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first is the Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests for the overall validity of the instruments by 
analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The second 
test examines the hypothesis that the error term differenced regression is not second-order serially 
correlated, which implies that the error term in the level regression is not serially correlated. The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses in both cases provides support to the model. 
The main concern is to test some hypotheses on the determinants of problem loans. 
Therefore, the focus is not on predicting the factors influencing problem loans in a particular 
bank. The hypothesis that tests the study requires using an estimation procedure that avoids 
estimation biases as much as possible. This necessitates the use of the GMM procedure. Such 
estimation technique also requires transforming the dependent variable, in order to make it 
suitable to employ the GMM technique. 
The result of the analysis is presented in the second column of Table 5 (Model 1). The 
hypothesis of a significant first-order and no second-order serial correlation (keeping in mind that 
equation 1 has been transformed to first differences) and the hypothesis of validity of the 
instruments used (Sargan’s test) are not rejected. Therefore, the former tests guarantee the 
consistency of the estimators and the validity of the instruments employed  
Regarding the explanatory variables, there is evidence of high level of persistence in the 
NPL variable. The macroeconomic controls when significant, have the expected sign. Thus, an 
acceleration of GDP leads to a decline in problem loans. More specifically, GDP growth has a 
contemporaneous impact, suggesting that downturn in economic activity get reflected in problem 
loans fairly quickly, but does not exhibit persistence. Real interest rates, on the other hand, do not 
seem to exert any significant influence on problem loans.  
At the micro level, there is a strongly significant and positive impact of credit growth on 
problem loans, with a lag of 1 year. Therefore, an increase in credit today will have a negative 
impact on problem loans one year hence. Loan growth loses significance when lagged multiple 
periods, suggesting that over-extension of credit are transmitted fairly quickly into problem loans. 
The composition of the loan portfolio (NPRIOL) negatively impacts problem loans, corroborating 
stricter credit evaluation standards for loans to corporates. The negative coefficient on risk 
premium proxy (PRM) indicates that competitive pressures have been engendering cross-
subsidisation of products inside banks. Finally, larger banks appear to have higher problem loans 
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than smaller ones. Although bigger banks allow for greater diversification opportunities, it could 
be outweighed by higher problem loans on overall quantum of credit extended, leading to a 
positive sign on this variable. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Credit Risk: GMM Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lagged Dependent variable 0.854 (0.032)*** 0.854 (0.032)*** 0.854 (0.033)***
Microeconomic 
Loan growth with 1 lag 0.314 (0.154)** 0.329 (0.154)** 0.317 (0.187)**
Loan growth with 2 lags 0.185 (0.210) 0.175 (0.208) 0.184 (0.212)
Loan growth with 3 lags -0.049 (0.161) -0.026 (0.150) -0.046 (0.182)
Loan growth with 4 lags 0.136 (0.148) 0.111 (0.129) 0.135 (0.154)
Bank branch growth with 2 lags 0.044 (0.059) 0.047 (0.058) 0.045 (0.060)
Bank branch growth with 3 lags 0.056 (0.065) 0.047 (0.062) 0.056 (0.065)
NPRIOL -0.048 (0.026)* -0.050 (0.025)** -0.048 (0.026)**
INEFF 0.144 (0.342) 0.108 (0.341) 0.143 (0.345)
SIZE 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)***
Spread with 1 lag -0.278 (0.233) -0.297 (0.239) -0.279 (0.237)
Spread with 2 lags -0.205 (0.159) -0.185 (0.155) -0.204 (0.159)
CRAR with 2 lags 0.0002 (0.0009) 0.0002 (0.0009) 0.0002 (0.0009)
CRAR with 3 lags 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0004 (0.0005)
PRM with 3 lags -0.001 (0.0007)* -0.001 (0.0009) -0.001 (0.0007)*
REG -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005)
Macroeconomic 
GDP growth  -0.006 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.002)*
GDP growth with 1 lag -0.0007 (0.0009) -0.0006 (0.002)
Real interest rate with 1 lag 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
IIP -0.001 (0.008)
IIP with 1 lag 0.0005 (0.001)
MKTCAP -0.0003 (0.008)
No. of observations, time period 324; 1994-2005 324; 1994-2005 324; 1994-2005
Log likelihood -561.327 -561.697 -561.328
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
Most of the other variables are not significant at conventional levels. In other words, 
branch expansion strategies, operating expenses or interest margins do not exert any substantial 
impact on the problem loans of banks.  
As an alternative macroeconomic indicator, we employ the index of industrial production 
(IIP) instead of GDP. The results (Model 2) indicate that the coefficient on this variable is not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the predictive power of this variable is admittedly lower 
vis-à-vi GDP; most of the other explanatory variables are qualitatively unaltered in sign.  
As a variant of the aforesaid specification, we introduce the market capitalisation ratio 
(MKTCAP), defined as the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP. This variable attempts to 
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capture the transition from bank-based to market-based financial system. Intuitively, since a 
market-based system would imply less reliance on bank finance, this would possibly give rise to 
lower problem loans and consequently, we expect the coefficient to be negative. The results 
(Model 3) demonstrate that although MKTCAP is negative, it is not statistically significant, 
supporting the conjecture that a transition to a market-oriented financial system does not impinge 
on problem loans in any significant manner.  
 
6.1 Robustness Tests 
This section discusses certain robustness tests of the basic model discussed in the earlier 
section. Accordingly, we introduce several additional features in the framework to ascertain the 
robustness of the basic model. Table 6 summarises the results. 
Table 6: Determinants of Credit Risk: Robustness Tests – GMM Results 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Lagged Dependent variable 0.851 (0.032)*** 0.866 (0.032)*** 0.854 (0.032)***
Macroeconomic  
GDP growth  -0.005 (0.001)*** -0.008 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.001)***
GDP growth with 1 lag -0.0006 (0.0009) -0.0006 (0.0009) -0.0007 (0.0009)
Real interest rate with 1 lag 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
REG -0.002 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005)
Microeconomic  
Loan growth with 1 lag 0.307 (0.155)** 0.314 (0.155)** 0.314 (0.154)**
Loan growth with 2 lags 0.193 (0.206) 0.153 (0.209) 0.185 (0.210)
Loan growth with 3 lags -0.055 (0.162) -0.041 (0.162) -0.049 (0.161)
Loan growth with 4 lags 0.147 (0.152) 0.120 (0.152) 0.136 (0.148)
Bank branch growth with 2 lags 0.039 (0.061) 0.041 (0.061) 0.044 (0.059)
Bank branch growth with 3 lags 0.051 (0.067) 0.058 (0.065) 0.056 (0.065)
NPRIOL -0.049 (0.025)** -0.053 (0.026)** -0.048 (0.026)*
INEFF 0.132 (0.345) 0.197 (0.349) 0.144 (0.342)
SIZE 0.004 (0.001)** 0.004 (0.002)*
Spread with 1 lag -0.285 (0.227) -0.263 (0.218) -0.278 (0.233)
Spread with 2 lags -0.210 (0.155) -0.187 (0.147) -0.205 (0.159)
CRAR with 2 lags 0.0002 (0.0009) 0.0002 (0.0008) 0.002 (0.0009)
CRAR with 3 lags 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0003 (0.0005) 0.0004 (0.0005)
PRM with 2 lags -0.001 (0.0007)* -0.001 (0.0007)* -0.001 (0.0007)*
BIG 0.001 (0.004)  
DIVEST 0.005 (0.003) 
|GDPGR|  -0.0006 (0.001)
No. of observations, time period 324; 1994-2005 324; 1994-2005 324; 1994-2005
Log likelihood -561.411 -561.659 -561.327
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.  
  
 
 18
First, we investigated whether non-performing loans differ among big versus small 
banks. Towards this end, we constructed a dummy variable (BIG), which assumed a value of 1 if 
the bank had total asset of at least Rs.2 billion (belonging to the 90th percentile of asset 
distribution) at the beginning of the sample period. As observed from the second column of Table 
5 (Model 4), the sign on the coefficient was negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
bigger banks tend to have lower problem loans, perhaps owing to their better portfolio 
diversification or possibly even superior credit risk management techniques. 
Second, we tested whether the problem loans are symmetric, i.e., whether they decrease 
in the same way during upturns as they increase in downturns. In particular, we added a new 
independent variable: the absolute value of the difference between GDP growth in a particular 
year and the average GDP growth in the sample period. The estimates (Model 5) indicate that the 
variable is negative, but not statistically significant.  
A final issue of interest was whether problem loans are, in any way, affected by the 
ownership structure of institutions. In particular, several state-owned banks have made an initial 
public offering over the sample period and thus have lowered the Government holding in them. 
Evidence from the US banking industry seems to suggest that different ownership structures and 
distinct corporate governance arrangements might have different effects on the risk profile of 
institutions (Himmelberg et al., 1999). We, therefore, constructed a variable (DIVEST), which 
was 1 in a particular year (and all subsequent years), if a bank had made an equity offering in that 
year and zero, otherwise. The revised estimation result (Model 6), reveals that the sign of the 
variable is negative, but not statistically significant. The remaining properties of the model are not 
affected in any meaningful manner. 
 
7. Policy Implications 
While there have been several contributions to the literature on determinants of 
bankruptcy of non-financial firms, empirical studies focusing exclusively on the determinants of 
problem loans of banks have been limited. The present paper attempts to address this 
shortcoming. Using data on state-owned banks for 1994-2005, the paper finds that credit risk is 
significantly influenced by individual bank-level variables. The result holds even after controlling 
for macroeconomic conditions. 
There are several policy implications that can be gleaned from the analysis. First, 
evidence suggests that rapid expansion of lending by banks often leads to poor loan quality, albeit 
with a lag, because the growth of lending may outstrip the lender’s capacity to appraise and 
monitor its borrowers. In this context, Honohan (1997) has advocated ‘speed limits’ to restrict the 
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rate of growth of banks’ loan portfolios. Such ‘speed limits’ need not necessarily be applied to the 
entire loan portfolio, but could be restricted to those types of lending which are perceived as 
posing significant risk to banks' loan portfolio and can therefore engender problem loans. Such an 
approach has recently been adopted in the Indian context, where the RBI has raised the risk 
weight on retail loans, which seemed in danger of overextension. 
Second, it is observed that bigger banks tend to have higher problem loans. This suggests 
that the potential risk-reducing benefit of diversification may need to be traded-off against the 
paucity of adequate skills in credit evaluation in big banks, akin to the institutional memory 
hypothesis. This assumes importance in view of the current spate of consolidation witnessed by 
the Indian banking industry (RBI, 2001). 
Finally, from the supervisory standpoint, excessive rapid loan growth, as well as sharp 
declines in bank capital levels are useful pointers to the deterioration in the financial health of 
banks and can be employed as early warning indicators of future problem loans.  
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